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BUSINESS METHODS AND PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER FOLLOWING INRE BILSKI: IS
"ANYTHING UNDER THE SUN MADE BY MAN"
REALLY PATENTABLE?
Robert A. McFarlanet & Robert G. Littstt
Abstract
The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bilski sought to answer
once and for all whether, and to what extent, business methods may
be patented and to articulate the standard that governs the
patentability of all processes. The court's majority opinion both
confirmed that there is no exclusion preventing the patenting of
business methods and announced a new "machine-or-
transformation" test to analyze patents on processes in all fields.
Given the controversy surrounding this decision, it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.
This article first reviews the Federal Circuit's Bilski decision,
including its historical context and its ramifications in defining what
may be patented. It then considers the questions facing the Supreme
Court by addressing some of the criticisms of the Federal Circuit's
majority decision. Finally, it offers a solution that conforms to
Supreme Court precedent and Constitutional requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite Supreme Court precedent holding that "anything under
the sun that is made by man" is patentable,' courts have struggled for
decades to place reasonable limitations on the kinds of inventions that
can be protected under United States patent statutes. It is well settled,
for example, that laws of nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas,
and mathematical algorithms cannot be patented.2 Defining the outer
boundaries of patentable subject matter has become even more
complicated due to the emergence of patents directed to computer-
related inventions and methods for executing transactions over the
Internet. Recently, "business method patents," i.e., those that
purportedly cover novel methods for conducting certain business
processes related to such activities as tax accounting3 and investment
strategies,4 have generated enormous controversy.
The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in In re Bilski sought to
answer once and for all whether, and to what extent, business
methods may be patented and to articulate the standard that governs
the patentability of all processes.s The Federal Circuit's decision has,
however, raised at least as many questions as it answered and has
been the subject of well-reasoned criticism from within the court
itself6 and from many quarters of the legal and business
communities.' The Federal Circuit's majority opinion addresses the
1. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952); H. R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
2. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
3. See, e.g., More on the Uncertain Status of Tax-Related Patents, 109 J. TAX'N 379
(2008).
4. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
5. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
6. Nine of the sitting Federal Circuit judges signed on to the majority opinion. However,
Judges Newman, Mayer and Rader each filed lengthy dissents fundamentally disagreeing with
the majority's reasoning. Id. at 976. (Newman, J., dissenting), 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting)), 1011
(Rader, J., dissenting).
7. The range of criticism is well represented in the amicus briefs filed in support of
Bilski's Writ Petition. See, e.g., Brief of Accenture and Pitney Bowes Inc. As Amici Curiae In
Support of Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, cert. granted, No. 08-964 (Supreme Court, March 2,
2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association In Support of
The Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, cert. granted, No. 08-964 (Supreme Court,
March 2, 2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae Borland Software Corporation in Support of Petitioner,
Bilski v. Doll, cert. granted, No. 08-964 (Supreme Court, March 2, 2009); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Boston Patent Law Association In Support Of Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, cert. granted,
No. 08-964 (Supreme Court, March 2, 2009); Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N. V. as
Amicus Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, cert. granted, No. 08-964 (Supreme
Court, March 2, 2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae Medistem Inc. In Support Of The Petition For A
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patentability of a claimed method for hedging risk in commodities
trading.8 Contrary to the hopes of many, the court held there is no
"exclusion" that prevents the patenting of business methods and that
the patentability of such methods is governed by the same principles
as all other processes. Additionally, Bilski announced a new
"machine-or-transformation" test that it declared is now the exclusive
test for determining the patentability of processes in all fields,
including business methods.9 In view of the strong criticism of the
majority opinion, as well as difficulties in applying this test that were
openly acknowledged in the majority opinion,o it was no surprise
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 1, 2009."
This article places Bilski into its historical context, addresses its
ramifications in defining what may be patented, and analyzes the
decision to be made by the Supreme Court. Following this
introduction, Part Two briefly reviews the treatment of patentable
subject matter leading up to the Federal Circuit's 1998 decision in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,' 2
which gave rise to much of the recent controversy surrounding
business method patents. Part Three discusses the State Street
decision, its impact on the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, and
the state of the law immediately prior to Bilski. Part Four discusses
the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski, and the significant changes it
represents on issues of patentability. Part Five analyzes representative
early decisions of the Federal Circuit, the district courts, and the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences applying In re Bilski, and
discusses early patterns emerging from these decisions. Finally, part
Six analyzes some of the criticisms of the majority decision and
proposes a solution to the question of patent-eligibility that would
conform with Supreme Court precedent and Constitutional
requirements.
Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, cert. granted, No. 08-964 (Supreme Court, February 27, 2009).
8. Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
9. Id. at 961.
10. Id. at 956.
11. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (mem.).
12. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
A. Patentable Subject Matter, Abstract Ideas, and the
Mathematical Algorithm Exception
The Patent Act of 1952 broadly defines the statutory subject
matter for which a patent can be obtained as "any new and useful,
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof. . . .,"" and the Supreme Court has
construed this language broadly to reflect congressional intent that
patentable subject matter "include anything under the sun that is made
by man."l4 Despite this seemingly unbounded definition, courts have
placed numerous limitations on the scope of patentable subject matter.
Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are clearly not
patentable, regardless of whether they fall within the statutory subject
matter listed in the Patent Act.15
The proscription against patenting abstract ideas has given rise to
several categories of "exclusions" from the statutory subject matter.
One such exclusion is the "mathematical algorithm" exception, under
which a "scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a
patentable invention, [however,] a novel and useful structure created
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be." 1 6 The Supreme
Court provided guidance with regard to the mathematical algorithm
exception in holding that claims directed to a method for converting
binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers were not
patentable." The Court noted that "[t]he claims were not limited to
any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or
machinery, or to any particular end use [and] purported to cover any
use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of
any type." 8 The Court focused on whether or not the patent claims
attempted to "wholly preempt" the recited algorithm, stating that:
13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).
14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (citing S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.
R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)). The Patent Act also broadly and somewhat circularly defines a
"process" to mean a "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
15. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
16. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (emphasis
added).
17. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
18. Id. at 64.
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The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer,
which means that . .. [if the claims are allowed], the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself 19
As such, the claims were not allowed.20
B. Courts Have Made Several Attempts to Articulate Tests
Governing The Patentability of "Abstract Ideas"
Determining whether or not patent claims are directed to
unpatentable abstract ideas can be a difficult task, even for courts that
frequently handle patent disputes. To resolve questions of
patentability in a consistent and predictable manner, courts have
crafted numerous criteria to determine whether patents improperly
cover abstract ideas. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
articulated one such standard, referred to as the "technological arts"
test.2 1 In permitting claims directed to a method for obtaining
seismograms delineating subsurface formations in the earth's crust,
the C.C.P.A. stated:
All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of
operational steps a statutory "process" within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with
the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of 'useful
arts.' 22
19. Id. at 71-72. The Court also noted that the patent laws could be extended to cover
such inventions, but that such change must originate in Congress. Id.
20. Id. at 73. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed on more than one occasion that
mathematical formulas, standing alone, are simply not patentable. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185
("a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent . . ."); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("[r]easoning that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is
like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be the
subject of a patent."). The Federal Circuit, for its part, has explained that the mathematical
algorithm exception does not set forth a new category of unpatentable subject matter, but rather
is merely an application of the principle that abstract ideas are not patent-eligible. See In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("certain types of mathematical subject matter,
standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of
practical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, entitled to patent
protection.").
21. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
22. Id. (emphasis added). The C.C.P.A. also rejected the so-called "mental steps" test. Id.
at 892-893 ("The... board opinion further reveal[s] that the board repeatedly asserted that steps
were 'mental' and rendered the claims non-statutory because they were not physical acts applied
to physical things. This presumes that the law requires all steps of a statutory 'process' to be
physical acts applied to physical things. We considered this matter in [In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968)]. In the first opinion by Judge Smith we showed how this erroneous idea
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The C.C.P.A. based this "technological arts" test on the text of the
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . .,23 under which courts have
interpreted the term "useful arts" to mean 'technological arts." 24
Another influential test used for a time to determine whether a
patent improperly claimed an abstract idea was referred to as the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test, which arose from a trio of opinions
issued by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 2 5 This test
included two steps:
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical
algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to
determine whether the algorithm is "applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps," and, if it is, it "passes muster
under section 101."
The Federal Circuit subsequently crafted yet another standard
defining patentable subject matter by requiring that the claim produce
"a useful, concrete, and tangible result."2 7 For example, the court used
this standard to find claims directed to a means for creating a smooth
waveform display in a digital oscilloscope wcre patentable. 2 8
Specifically, the court stated:
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements
arose from a dictum in [Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876)], and is inconsistent with
several later Supreme Court opinions. In Judge Baldwin's Prater opinion we readopted a large
portion of Judge Smith's opinion on this point and again pointed out that it was a
misconstruction to assume that 'all processes, to be patentable, must operate physically upon
substances."').
23. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
24. See, e.g., In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("The phrase
'technological arts,' as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase 'useful arts' as it appears
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.") As discussed below, this test has been disapproved.
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
25. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758,
767 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982). As discussed below, this
test was subsequently disapproved by the Federal Circuit. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
26. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (emphasis added). The Federal
Circuit continued, at least for a time, to cite this test with approval. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1543 n. 21 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
27. See, e.g., Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544. This test has also been disapproved. See Bilski,
545 F.3d at 959-60.
28. Id. at 1541-45.
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recited in [the claim at issue] represent circuitry elements that
perform mathematical calculations, which is essentially true of all
digital electrical circuits, the claimed invention as a whole is
directed to a combination of interrelated elements which combine
to form a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples
into . . . illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means. This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may
be characterized as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.29
Thus, the court determined that the claim at issue was "not 'so
abstract and sweeping' that it would 'wholly pre-empt' the use of any
apparatus employing the combination of mathematical calculations
recited therein." 30 Rather, the court found that the claim "is limited to
the use of a particularly claimed combination of elements performing
the particularly claimed combination of calculations to .. . produce a
smooth waveform."3 1
C. The Development of a "Business Method" Exception
In addition to the technological arts, Freeman-Walter-Abele, and
"useful, concrete and tangible result" tests, a controversial "business
method" exception arose to limit the patents from covering what
might constitute abstract ideas. This controversial exception
originated in a 1908 Second Circuit opinion holding that claims
directed to an accounting method designed to prevent theft by hotel
staff were invalid.32 However, despite decrying patents on business
methods, the court actually based its holding of invalidity on a lack of
novelty, and held that "there is no patentable novelty either in the
physical means employed or in the method described and claimed."3
Long after the Second Circuit's holding in Hotel Security
Checking, the Federal Circuit seemed to acknowledge, albeit in dicta,
the existence of the "business method" exception. In describing two
decisions by its predecessor court, the Federal Circuit stated in In re
Alappat that "a business methodology for deciding how salesmen
29. Id. at 1544. (emphasis added).
30. Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68-72 (1973)).
31. Id. at 1545 (Notably, the court also rejected the notion that "a programmed general
purpose computer could never be viewed as patentable subject matter under Section 101").
32. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2nd Cir. 1908) ("In the
sense of the patent law, an art is not a mere abstraction. A system of transacting business
disconnected from the means for carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal
interpretation of the term, an art").
33. Id. at 472.
1
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should best handle respective customers" and a "'system' for aiding a
neurologist in diagnosing patients" did not fall within any subject
matter patentable under section 101 of the Patent Act.34 Even though
the CCPA decided both prior cases under the mathematical algorithm
exception, and not any formal exception governing business methods,
this discussion in In re Alappat arguably recognized the possibility
that the business method exception had continuing application.3 5
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S STATE STREET DECISION AND
A GOLDEN AGE FOR BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
A. State Street Expressly Permitted Business Methods to be
Patented.
The Federal Circuit waded deep into the controversy surrounding
the patentability of business methods through the influential panel
decision issued in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc,36 which arguably opened the floodgates for the
issuance of so-called "business method" patents. 37 While holding that
34. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing In re Maucorps, 609
F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding that claims directed to optimizing the organization of
sales representatives were unpatentable because the "claimed invention as a whole comprises
each and every means for carrying out a solution technique for a set of equations wherein one
number is computed from a set of numbers. Thus, appellant's claims wholly preempt the recited
algorithms ... ") and In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that claims
relating to a process and an apparatus for testing a complex system and analyzing the results of
the tests were unpatentable because they "are [directed] to a mathematical algorithm
representing a mental process that had not been applied to physical elements or process steps
and [are], therefore, not limited to any otherwise statutory process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter")).
35. Id. at 1541. During this time frame, at least one Federal Circuit Judge harshly
criticized any recognition of a business method exception. Judge Newman, in a dissenting
opinion, agreed with the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that the exception was a
"fuzzy" concept, and went on to roundly criticize it. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297-98
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Indeed [the concept of a business method exception]
is fuzzy; and since it is also an unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject
matter in section 101, my guidance is that it be discarded as error-prone, redundant, and
obsolete. It merits retirement from the glossary of section 101."). Judge Newman also noted that
cases mentioning the possibility of a business methods exception were, in fact, decided on other
grounds such as novelty or non-obviousness. Id. at 298.
36. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
37. "Business methods" are difficult to define. The USPTO's classification for
inventions that it deems "business methods," Classification 705, states in part:
This is the generic class for apparatus and corresponding methods for performing
data processine operations, in which there is a significant change in the data or
for performing calculation operations wherein the apparatus or method is
uniquely designed for or utilized in the practice, administration, or management
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the patent-in-suit was directed to statutory subject matter, the Federal
Circuit made three critical rulings by:
* Rejecting the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for determining
whether a claimed invention is directed to unpatentable abstract
idea;
* Following the useful, concrete and tangible result test to
determine whether a claim that recites a fundamental principle is
directed to patent-eligible subject matter; and
* "Laying to rest" the so-called "business method" exception to
statutory subject matter.3 8
The dispute in State Street involved a declaratory judgment
action brought by State Street Bank & Trust Co. ("State Street")
against Signature Financial Group, Inc. ("Signature"). 3 9 The patent-
in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 ("the '056 Patent"), described a
data processing system for use with an investment vehicle involving a
purportedly novel "hub and spoke" concept. 40 According to the
patent, this form of investment was useful for minimizing fund
operating costs by combining the assets of multiple investment funds
(such as mutual funds, pension funds, common trust funds, and other
types of institutional and retail funds) into one large asset base. 4 1 This
commingling of fund assets was achieved by creating a "partnership
portfolio" (the "hub") in which each of the individual funds (the
"spokes") invested all of their assets.42
The "hub" made daily allocations of income, capital gains,
expenses and/or investment losses to each of the funds comprising the
spokes, which gave rise to a variety of complex administrative
challenges, 4 3 and the '056 Patent specifically claimed a data
of an enterprise, or in the processing of financial data.
This class also provides for apparatus and corresponding methods for performing
data processine or calculating operations in which a charge for goods or services
is determined.....
available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc705/defs705.htm.
38. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373-77.
39. Id. at 1370.
40. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 col. 5 11. 35-38 (filed Mar. 11, 1991).
41. Id. at col. I 11. 27-40 and 11. 51-61.
42. Id. at col. I 1. 61-col. 2 1. 2. The partnership portfolio was to be registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as an investment company, but the partnership portfolio was
treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes and circumvented then-existing laws that
restricted the commingling of fund assets. See id. at col. I 11. 42-50 and col. 11. 61-col. 2 1. 2.
43. Id. at col. 2 11. 48-50; col. 2 1. 67-col. 3 1. 22. For example, since the "partners" of the
partnership portfolio are funds whose assets change daily as customers made additional
investments or withdrawals, each fund's interest in the partnership portfolio also changes daily.
See id. at col. 2 1. 68-col. 3 1. 4. Further changes in the partnership interest of each fund arise as
43
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processing system for implementing these transactions within the hub
and spoke configuration.44 The patent includes one independent claim
and five dependent claims, each of which is written in mean-plus-
function format.45 Significantly, even though the claims merely
recited a business method implemented on a personal computer, the
Federal Circuit determined that claims were directed to a "machine"
rather than to a "process."46 The court also noted that a "machine" is
one of the four categories of proper statutory subject matter
enumerated in 35 U.S.C. Section 101,47 and concluded that it was
wholly improper to restrict the scope of the enumerated categories of
patentable subject matter in view of the use of the term "any" in 35
U.S.C. §101.48
the value of the assets of each fund increases or decreases in, and as additional funds invest in
the portfolio or existing funds withdraw their investment in the portfolio. See '056 Patent col. 3
11. 17-22. In view of these administrative challenges, the '056 Patent states that a "new and
unique data processing system and method is necessary to enable accurate daily allocations to be
made among each of the funds in a portfolio." See '056 Patent col. 3 11. 22-25. The data
processing system described in the '056 Patent determines and manages these daily allocations
by calculating "allocation ratios" for each of the individual funds, taking into account a number
of factors listed in the patent. See '056 Patent col. 3 1. 52-col. 4 1. 30. In addition to calculating
the allocation ratios, the data processing system also determines, each day and over time, data
necessary for calculating aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital gains or losses for
tax and accounting purposes. See '056 Patent col. 4 11. 30-33.
44. '056 Patent col. 13 1. 20-col. 16 1. 5.
45. '056 Patent col. 13 1. 20-col. 16 1. 5. Means-plus-function claims are those governed
by 35 U.S.C. Section 112 16 ("An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claims shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof") For each of the means-
plus-function limitations in Claim 1 of the patent, the Federal Circuit identified structure recited
in the patent specification corresponding to the function recited in the claim. The structures
included generic components of a personal computer, such as a "CPU," a "data disk," and an
"arithmetic logic circuit" configured to perform the various steps recited in the claims. State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
46. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372. Notably, the Federal Circuit also stated that whether
the patent claims were directed to a "machine" or a "process" was irrelevant to its analysis since
both are proper statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. While the Federal Circuit
determined that the invention claimed in the '056 Patent was directed to a "machine," it also
stated that for the purpose of determining whether or not the claimed invention was statutory
subject matter, it was "of little relevance" whether the claim was directed to a "machine" or a
"process." Id. at 1372. The court stated that all that mattered was that the claimed invention fell
into at least one of the four categories enumerated in 35 U.S.C. Section 101.
47. Id. at 1372.
48. Id. at 1373. ("The repetitive use of the expansive term "any" in § 101 shows
Congress's intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be
obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that Congress intended § 101 to extend to anything under the sun that is made by
man. Thus, it is improper to read limitations into § 101 on the subject matter that may be
patented where the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did not intend such
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Having found that the claims fell within one of the enumerated
categories of patentable subject matter, the court analyzed the claims
under two judicially-created exclusions-the "mathematical
algorithm" exception and the "business method" exception. 4 9 The
court first noted that "mathematical algorithms are not patentable
subject matter to the extent that they are merely abstract ideas," and
reasoned that "certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing
alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to
some type of practical application, i.e., "a useful, concrete and
tangible result."50 Applying this test, the Federal Circuit held that:
the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces "a useful,
concrete and tangible result"-a final share price momentarily
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and
relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.....
"[T]he mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting
numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing
numbers, in and of itself, would not render it non-statutory subject
matter, unless, of course, its oreration does not produce a "useful,
concrete and tangible result."5
Thus, the Federal Circuit expressly adopted and applied the "useful,
concrete and tangible result" test as governing the patentability of the
claim. 52
The State Street decision rejected the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test, finding that the earlier test could be "misleading" and had "little,
if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject
matter" under Supreme Court precedent.5 3 The decision also
expressly repudiated the so-called "business method" exception.5 4
The court stated that "[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business methods
have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or
limitations." (Internal citations and quotations omitted)).
49. Id. at 1373-77.
50. Id. at 1373 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) and In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1544 (Fed, Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 1373-74 (citing Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed, Cir. 1994)) (emphasis
added).
52. See id. at 1373-75.
53. Id. at 1374.
54. Id. at 1375.
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method,"55 and that "[w]hether the patent's claims are too broad to be
patentable is not to be judged under § 101, but rather under §§ 102,
103, and 112."'5 The court also noted that the business method
exception had never been invoked by the Federal Circuit or the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals to deny patentability.
Any remaining uncertainty regarding the patentability of
business methods that included "process" claims rather than
"machine" claims was addressed in the Federal Circuit's subsequent
58
opinion in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., which
solidified the court's interpretation favoring patentability. AT&T
involved a patent directed to a message recording system for long-
distance telephone calls. 5 9 Unlike the claims at issue in State Street,
which were directed to a "machine," the claims at issue in AT&T
60
recited a "process" for implementing a mathematical algorithm. In
holding the claims patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Federal
Circuit rejected arguments that method claims containing
mathematical algorithms must produce a "physical transformation" or
conversion of subject matter from one state to another to constitute
patentable subject matter, and explained that a physical
transformation "is not an invariable requirement, but merely one
example of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful
application."6' Similarly, the court rejected the argument that process
claims must include physical limitations to constitute patentable
subject matter, reasoning that, unlike apparatus claims written in
means-plus-function format (such as the claims at issue in State
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1377. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2004) (Section 102 governs novelty.
Section 103 governs obviousness. Section 112 governs the specification including the written
description, best mode, and enablement requirements).
57. Id. at 1375-76. Indeed, the Court observed that Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., the case typically credited for establishing the business method exception, relied
on another ground to find the patent-in-suit invalid. Id. at 1376. That did not mean, however,
that all business method inventions were patentable. Such inventions still had to fall within the
one of the four enumerated categories of subject matter listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101, could not
constitute one of the categories of non-patentable subject matter as set forth by the Supreme
Court, namely "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas," and a business method
that employed a mathematical algorithm would have to produce "a useful, concrete and tangible
result" in order to be patentable. See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("If a claim in a patent covers material not found in any of the four statutory categories, that
claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope of patentable subject matter, even if the subject
matter is otherwise new and useful.").
58. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
59. Id. at 1353.
60. Id. at 1354-55, 1358.
61. Id. at 1358-59.
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Street), process claims do not require supporting structure in the
62
written description corresponding to the recited process steps. In
view of this analysis, the court held that the claims at issue fell
"comfortably within the broad scope of patentable subject matter
under Section l0l."63
B. State Street Generated A Storm of Controversy.
Thus, after the Federal Circuit's opinions in State Street and
AT&T, patents directed to business methods could clearly qualify as
patentable subject matter so long as they produced a "useful, concrete,
and tangible result," and those that included process claims did not
have to recite any structural limitations to be patentable. These
holdings generated an extraordinary level of controversy within the
legal, academic and business communities. One concern was that the
quality of business method patents that began issuing after State
Street was much lower than that of other patents.64 Additionally, some
believed that business patents simply should not be permitted because
of their perceived negative impact on business and innovation. For
example, Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford University Law
School argued repeatedly that the explosion of business method and
software patents would have a "devastating effect" on the future of
cyberspace by advantaging large institutions that can afford the
transaction costs associated with obtaining such patents at the expense
65
of smaller companies and open source initiatives. Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit's Judge Posner expressed concern over the issuance
of "what would have in the olden days been thought dubious
improvements in business methods . . .," and wrote that such patents
would lead to stifling licensing fees.66 Indeed, the controversy over
62. Id. at 1359.
63. Id.
64. John R. Allison & Emerson M. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 991-92 (2003).
65. Lawrence Lessig, The Death Of Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 337, 345-346
(2000) ("There are patents for selling software on the web; patents for running reverse auctions
on the web; patents for ecommerce on the web; patents for just about every activity you might
dream to engage in on the World Wide Web. Cyberspace is being littered with claims of
intellectual property; it is becoming filled with suits demanding payment before progress can
continue.").
66. Hon. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 173, 184 (2005) ("[W]hen a firm now contemplates making a
new product or adopting a new method of doing business, it confronts a much larger array of
existing patents than in the old days -- a veritable thicket of patents. What this means is that
firms incur additional expenses in negotiating for patent licenses.") Judge Posner further
expressed concern that these patents will actually harm economic growth, rather than advance
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business method patents was so great that remedial legislation was
introduced, although never passed, in Congress,67 and the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office instituted procedures to specially address the
perceived weaknesses of business method patents.
In addition to these commentators, the Federal Circuit itself
arguably gave signals that State Street's holdings were being applied
too expansively. For example, In re Comiskey held that certain
method claims directed to a novel way of requiring and conducting
arbitration that required use of a mechanical device were patentable,
whereas similar claims that did not specifically require the use of a
mechanical device were unpatentable. 69 The court explained that "the
present statute does not allow patents to be issued on particular
business systems-such as a particular type of arbitration-that
depend entirely on the use of mental processes." 7 0 Another post-State
Street decision, In re Nuijten, addressed the patentability of an
electrical signal under § 101,71 and, in a more restrictive holding,
concluded that an electrical signal was not patentable because
"transitory embodiments are not directed to statutory subject
matter."72
On the other hand, some commentators opined that the criticism
of the Federal Circuit's holding in State Street was overblown. For
example, one suggested that "[t]he negative statements about business
method patents are . . . largely based on fundamental
misunderstandings."73 According to the authors, the advent of the
Internet resulted in a debate between "free cyberspace advocates
the useful arts as contemplated by the Constitution. ("[T]he lax standard of the patent office may
be creating incentives for strategic uses of intellectual property that end up making invention
more costly, more burdensome, thus reducing the rate and distorting the direction of [inventive]
activity. It is another example of how increasing propertization, whether through increasing the
length of the property right or the scope of the property right, can actually impair the economic
goals that underlie the intellectual property laws.") Id. at 185. The verdict that State Street's
permissive approach to business method patents was problematic was far from unanimous,
however. Some argued that the concern over the quality of business patents was unfounded.
67. See The Business Method Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2000);
The Business Method Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001).
68. BUSINESS METHODS PATENT INITIATIVE: AN ACTION PLAN (2000),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/actionplan.html.
69. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1369-75 (Fed. Cir. 2007), aff'd en banc, 554 F.3d 697
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
70. Id. at 1378.
71. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
72. Id. at 1353.
73. Robert E. Lyon & Christopher A. Vanderlaan, Method Madness, L.A. LAW., 23 Oct.
2000, at 28.
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[who] call for absolutely unregulated use of and access to the
Internet. . ." and "proponents of... patents [on Internet-related
processes who] see the Internet as simply another frontier of
technology for which patents have played a useful role in fostering
innovation and protecting financial investments by entrepreneurs." 74
The article states that Internet patents "can play a crucial role in
securing funding for start-up e-commerce companies."7 It also
downplays the possibility of business method patents "effectively
monopolizing broad regions of commercial cyberspace. . . "
suggesting that "very few, if any, patents have come into public focus
that, if properly construed, would foreclose reasonable
competition." 76 The article opined that criticisms of the quality of
business method patents were not supported by evidence,77 and it
concluded by predicting that "[i]n a few years we might well look
back and wonder what all the fuss over business method patents was
about."78
IV. INRE BILSKI AND THE EVOLUTION OF PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER
Following State Street, the controversy regarding the allowance
of business method patents and the debate regarding the overall scope
of patentable subject matter set the table for a seminal opinion to
define and clarify the limits of patentability in this area. That opinion
would be served by the en banc Federal Circuit in In re Bilski.
A. The Board's Decision in Ex Parte Bilski
In re Bilski came to the Federal Circuit via the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ("the Board"), and involved a patent
application for an invention directed to a method for hedging risk in
commodity trading. Claim 1, which exemplifies all of the claims at
issue, was a process claim that did not recite any structure to
implement its steps.79 The patent examiner rejected claim 1, as well as




78. Id. at 55.
79. Claim 1, read as follows:
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity
49
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all other claims, because it "merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and
solves a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a
practical application [.] [T]herefore, the invention is not directed to
the technological arts."80 Additionally, the patent claims were not
limited to operation on a computer, and, accordingly, were not limited
to any specific apparatus. 1
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences agreed with the
examiner that the claims were not patentable, but reached its
conclusion on very different grounds. The Board rejected the
"technological arts" test as unsupported by case law, and further
rejected the purported requirement that claims recite a specific
apparatus for performing the process steps because such claims need
not recite a specific apparatus as long as "there is a transformation of
physical subject matter from one state to another." 82 Nonetheless, the
Board found the claims unpatentable because they 1) did not involve
any patent-eligible transformation, 2) attempted to "preempt [] any
and every possible way of performing the steps of the [claimed
process], by human or any kind of machine or by any combination
thereof," and 3) did not produce a "useful, concrete and tangible"
result as required for process claims not reciting any structure.83
B. The Federal Circuit's En Banc Decision in Bilski
1. The Federal Circuit Adopted the "Machine-Or-
Transformation" Test to Deternine Patentability
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that the claims
at issue were not directed to patent-eligible subject matter, and
"clariflied] the standards applicable in determining whether a claimed
at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a
risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk
position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market
participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer
transactions.
See U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 08/833,892 claim I (filed Apr. 10, 1997) ('892
application); Ex parte Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL
5738364, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
80. Bilski, 2006 WL 5738364, at *2.
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id. at **41-42.
83. Id. at **46-47, **49-50.
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method constitutes a statutory 'process' under § 101.,,84 The
"machine-or-transformation" test strictly adopted by the en banc court
greatly alters the boundaries of patentability relative to the Federal
Circuit's previously-favored "useful, concrete and tangible result"
test.
As the court explained:
The Supreme Court ... has enunciated a definitive test to
determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle
rather than to pre-empt the principle itself. A claimed process is
surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.85
Another principle guiding the Federal Circuit's analysis appears
to be whether the claimed method attempts to cover all uses of an
algorithm or abstract idea. 86
The [Supreme] Court in Diehr thus drew a distinction between
those claims that "seek to pre-empt the use of' a fundamental
principle, on the one hand, and claims that seek only to foreclose
others from using a particular "application" of that fundamental
principle, on the other. Patents, by definition, grant the power to
exclude others from practicing that which the patent claims. Diehr
can be understood to suggest that whether a claim is drawn only to
a fundamental principle is essentially an inquiry into the scope of
that exclusion, i.e., whether the effect of allowing the claim would
be to allow the patentee to pre-empt substantially all uses of that
fundamental principle. If so, the claim is not drawn to patent-
eligible subject matter.
The Federal Circuit explained this basic principle by contrasting the
Supreme Court's analysis in two of its leading cases. In Diehr, "the
[Supreme] Court held that the claims at issue did not pre-empt all uses
of the Arrhenius equation but rather claimed only a process for curing
rubber ... which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the
84. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
85. Id. at 954 (emphasis in original). The court appeared to find particular significance in
the Supreme Court's statement in Gottschalk v. Benson that "[t]ransformation and reduction of
an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does
not include particular machines." Id. at 955-56 (emphasis in original) (quoting Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 770 (1972)).
86. Id. at 953.
87. Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
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equation."8 Accordingly, "one would still be able to use the
Arrhenius equation in any process not involving curing rubber, and
more importantly, even in any process to cure rubber that did not
include performing 'all of the other steps in their claimed process.' 89
As such, the claims in Diehr were patentable.
In Gottschalk v. Benson, on the other hand, the Supreme Court
reviewed "claims drawn to a process of converting data in binary-
coded decimal ('BCD') format to pure binary format via an algorithm
programmed onto a digital computer." 90 The Supreme Court held that
"[b]ecause the algorithm had no uses other than those that would be
covered by the claims (i.e., any conversion of BCD to pure binary on
a digital computer), the claims pre-empted all uses of the algorithm
and thus they were effectively drawn to the algorithm."9 1 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that Gottschalk presented a difficult
case because the claims were drafted so that the process was
implemented on a machine. 92 However, the Court held the claims
unpatentable, since "the limitations tying the process to a computer
were not actually limiting because the fundamental principle at issue,
a particular algorithm, had no utility other than operating on a digital
computer."93
The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bilski specifically
emphasized that process claims attempting to preempt all uses of an
algorithm are unpatentable:
A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a
particular machine or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the
principle that do not also use the specified machine or apparatus in
the manner claimed. And a claimed process that transforms a
particular article to a specified different state or thing by applying
a fundamental principle would not pre-empt the use of the
principle to transform any other article, to transform the same
article but in a manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything
other than transform the specified article. 94
In other words, the Federal Circuit viewed the machine-or-
transformation test as "the clue" to determining whether a claim
"would pre-empt substantially all uses of [a] fundamental principle,"
88. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)).
89. Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187).
90. Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (1972)).
91. Id at 954.
92. Id. at 955.
93. Id. at 955 (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72 (1972)).
94. Id. at 954.
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rendering the claim unpatentable.95
The Federal Circuit also provided important guidance regarding
application of the machine-or-transformation test.96  First, the
machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched inquiry, and an
applicant may show that a process claim is directed to statutory
subject matter by showing either that the claim is tied to a particular
machine or that the claim transforms an article.97 In this formulation,
"the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must
impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-
eligibility," and "the involvement of the machine or transformation in
the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution
activity." 9 8 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reiterated the Supreme
Court's admonition that "mere field-of-use limitations are generally
insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claims patent-
eligible." 99
The court provided only limited guidance concerning application
of the "machine" branch by noting that the claims at issue do not
"limit any process step to any specific machine or apparatus."100
Therefore, the court "le[ft] to future cases the elaboration of the
precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to
particular questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer
suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine."' 0'
The Bilski court provided more definitive guidance, however,
regarding the "transformation" branch. The transformation of an
"article" into a different state or thing "must be central to the purpose
of the claimed process" in order to impart patent-eligibility.' 02 The
95. See id. at 954. The court further noted that "mere field-of-use limitations are
generally insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claim patent-eligible." Id. at 957
(citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 (1981)). The court further noted that, "[p]re-emption of all
uses of a fundamental principle in all fields and pre-emption of all uses of the principle in only
one field both indicate that the claim is not limited to a particular application of the principle,"
and that "insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a
patentable process." Id. For example, "the Pythagorean theorem would not have been
patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application containing a final step indicating
that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques." Id.
(quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
96. Id. at 961-63.
97. Id. at 961 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 961-62.
99. Id. at 957 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 (1981)).
100. Id. at 962.
101. Id.; see also In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing machine
prong of test). In re Ferguson is discussed below.
102. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
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court also expounded on the meaning of "article" in applying this test.
A process involving "chemical or physical transformation of physical
objects or substances" involved the transformation of "articles" and,
therefore, constitutes patent-eligible subject matter."os However, the
court took a more measured approach to the patent-eligibility of "the
raw materials of. . . information-age processes" such as "electronic
signals and electronically-manipulated data," as well as "so-called
business methods ... [that] involve the manipulation of even more
abstract constructs such as legal obligations, organizational
relationships, and business risks."' 04
Thus, for example, a claim "reciting a process of graphically
displaying variances of data from average values" was unpatentable
where the claim "did not specify any particular type or nature of data,
nor ... how or from where the data was obtained or what the data
represented."05 On the other hand, a claim was patentable where the
claim specified, for example, "that 'said data is X-ray attenuation data
produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomography
scanner."'1 06 The court explained that the second claim was "drawn to
patent-eligible subject matter" because the "data clearly represented
physical and tangible objects, namely the structure of bones, organs,
and other body tissues" and thus "the transformation of that raw data
into a particular visual depiction of a physical object on a display was
sufficient to render that more narrowly-claimed process patent-
eligible." 07 The court noted that "[t]he electronic transformation of
the data itself into a visual depiction ... was sufficient; the claim was
not required to involve any transformation of the underlying physical
object that the data presented." 0 8 The court further explained that
"[s]o long as the claimed process is limited to a practical application
of a fundamental principle to transform specific data, and the claim is
limited to a visual depiction that represents specific physical objects
or substances, there is no danger that the scope of the claim would
wholly pre-empt all uses of the principle." 0 9
103. See id. (emphasis in original).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 962-63 (citing Abele, 684 F.2d at 908-09 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 963.
109. Id. The court cautioned, however, that merely "[a]dding a data-Rathering step to an
algorithm is insufficient to convert that algorithm into a patent-eligible process," because "[a]t
least in most cases, gathering data would not constitute a transformation of any article ... ," and
"[a] requirement simply that data inputs be gathered -- without specifying how -- is a
meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every algorithm inherently requires the
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2. The Federal Circuit Rejected Many of the Prior Tests
Used to Define Patent-Eligible Subject Matter as well
as the Business Method Exception
In addition to approving the "machine-or-transformation" test,
the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected a number of prior tests used to
determine whether claims were directed to unpatentable abstract
ideas. First, the court followed State Street and definitively rejected
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. 110 Second, the court rejected that
portion of State Street that adopted the "useful, concrete, and tangible
result" test:
while looking for 'a useful, concrete and tangible' result may in
many instances provide useful indications of whether a claim is
drawn to a fundamental principle or a practical application of such
a principle, that inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a
claim is patent-eligible under Section 101. And it was certainly
never intended to supplant the Supreme Court's test.111
The court further stated that the portions of its opinions in prior cases
"relying solely" on either the Freeman-Walter-Abele test or the
"useful, concrete, and tangible result" test "should no longer be relied
on."1 12 Third, the court rejected the "technological arts" test, stating
"[w]e perceive that the contours of such a test . .. would be unclear
because the meanings of the terms 'technological arts' and
'technology' are both ambiguous and ever-changing."l 3 Fourth, the
court rejected the "physical steps" test, stating that proponents of this
test misunderstood the court's decision in In re Comiskey. 114
Regarding the "physical steps" test, the court stated that:
[E]ven a claim that recites "physical steps" but neither recites a
particular machine or apparatus, nor transforms any article into a
different state or thing, is not drawn to patent-eligible subject
matter. Conversely, a claim that purportedly lacks any "physical
steps" but is still tied to a machine or achieves an eligible
gathering of data inputs." Id. The court also characterized the "inherent step of gathering data"
as an "insignificant extra-solution activity" that is incapable of imparting patent-eligibility on a
claim. Id.
110. Id. at 958-59 (stating that the Freeman-Walker-Abele test "appears to conflict with
the Supreme Court's proscription against dissecting a claim and evaluating patent-eligibility on
the bases of individual limitations").
111. Id. at 959.
112. Id. 959 n.17, 960 n.19.
113. Id. at 960. The court also noted that the "technological arts" test had never "been
explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court, this court, or our predecessor court . . . ." Id.
114. Id.at960-61.
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transformation passes muster under Section 101.1 15
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected a categorical "business-method"
exclusion, reaffirming that portion of its decision in State Street, and
reiterating that such an exception was "unlawful" because all process
claims, including business method claims, are "subject to the same
legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or
method."I 16
3. The Federal Circuit Found the Claims at Issue in Bilski
Were Not Patentable
Applying these principles, the Federal Circuit held that the
claims at issue in In re Bilski did not satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test and, therefore, were not directed to patent-eligible
subject matter.' The "[p]urported transformations or manipulations
simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships, business
risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the machine-or-
transformation test because they are not physical objects or
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or
substances."' 18 The court concluded that such processes "at most
incorporate[] only ineligible transformations," even if the claim "can
only be practiced by a series of physical acts."" 9 Simply put, claims
drawn to the mere "application of. . . human intelligence to the
solution of practical problems," such as the mental and mathematical
process of identifying transactions to hedge risk, improperly
attempted to claim an unpatentable fundamental principle.120
4. The Federal Circuit's Majority Recognized Potential
Difficulties Raised by its Machine-Or-Transformation
Test
The Federal Circuit majority acknowledged several potential
difficulties with respect to its endorsement of the machine-or-
115. Id. at 961. The court further stated that it actually applied the machine-or-
transformation test in In re Comiskey, that it did not adopt a "physical steps" test in that
decision, and that in prior cases it had actually criticized such an approach to the patent-
eligibility analysis. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359 (1999).
116. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. The court also acknowledged the argument made by some
amici that extending patent protection to pure methods of doing business is unconstitutional.
However, by refusing to adopt a business method exception, the court implicitly rejected this
constitutional argument. Id. at 960 n.22.
117. Id. at 963-64.
118. Id. at 963.
119. Id. at 963-964.
120. Id. at 964-65.
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transformation test. First, the court recognized that the Supreme Court
did not initially intend for the machine-or-transformation test to be the
sole test for determining patent-eligibility.12' Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that the machine-or-transformation test has
faced difficult challenges in the past decade due to "the widespread
use of computers and the advent of the Internet," and, further, that the
test may be ill-suited to address advancing technologies. 122
[W]e agree that future developments in technology and the
sciences may present difficult challenges to the machine-or-
transformation test, just as the widespread use of computers and
the advent of the Internet has begun to challenge it in the past
decade. Thus, we recognize that the Supreme Court may ultimately
decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this test to accommodate
emerging technologies. And we certainly do not rule out the
possibility that this court may in the future refine or augment the
test or how it is applied.123
Despite such potential shortcomings, the majority clearly adopted this
measure of patentability for process claims.
C. The Concurring Opinion by Judges Dyk and Linn Reinforced
the Court's Ability to Limit Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
In a concurring opinion, Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Linn, wrote
to specifically address two dissenting opinions that argued the
majority had usurped the legislative role.124 Judge Dyk wrote that the
Patent Act of 1793, the predecessor to 35 U.S.C. Section 101,
borrowed heavily from English patent law and practice, and
"explicitly recognized a limit on patentable subject matter." 25 Based
on their analysis of the English Statute of Monopolies and the other
English precedent at the time the U.S. Patent Statutes were first
enacted, Judges Dyk and Linn concluded that the method claims at
issue in In re Bilski would not have been considered patentable
subject matter in England at the time of the 1793 Act.126 Moreover,
121. See id. at 956. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 771 (1972) and Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978)).
122. Id. Indeed, the majority even contemplated that its decision might be reversed. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 966 (Dyk, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 967-68.
126. Id. at 970-72. Under the Eighteenth Century English law, "[tiere is no suggestion ...
that processes for organizing human activity were or ever had been patentable. Rather, the
uniform assumption was that the only processes that were patentable were processes for using or
creating manufactures, machines, and other composition of matter." Id. at 972.
57
58 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
between 1793 and 1952, when the patent statutes were reenacted,
neither the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office nor the federal courts
departed from English practice to allow patents such as those at issue
in In re Bilski.127 For these reasons, the concurring opinion
determined the majority's holding "does not reflect 'legislative' work,
but rather careful and respectful adherence to the Congressional
purpose."1 2 8
D. Judge Newman's Dissenting Opinion Directly Criticized the
Majority's Machine-Or- Transformation Test
Judge Newman wrote a lengthy dissent attacking the majority
opinion on the grounds that it "impose[s] a new and far-reaching
restriction on the kinds of inventions that are eligible to participate in
the patent system . . .," and that the majority "achieves this result by
redefining the word 'process' in the patent statute to exclude all
processes that do not transform physical matter or that are not
performed by machines."1 2 9 Judge Newman expressed concerns that
the machine-or-transformation test would "exclude[] many of the
kinds of inventions that apply today's electronic and photonic
technologies, as well as other processes that handle data and
information in novel ways,"13 0 and that the majority's definition of
"process" contradicted the Patent Act of 1952 and controlling
Supreme Court precedent.131 Finally, Judge Newman stated that the
majority opinion rejected the Federal Circuit's own precedent, put
into doubt the validity of patents issued to those who relied on the
prior rulings of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, and
introduced uncertainty into the issue of patent-eligibility.' 32
127. Id. at 974-76.
128. Id. at 976.
129. Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 976. Judge Newman's concerns are also shared by commentators analyzing
Bilski 's impact. See, e.g., Stefania Fusco, Is In re Bilski A Deja Vu?, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
PI, 1 1, 17 (2009), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/fusco-bilski-deja-vu.pdf; Warren D.
Woessner & Tania A. Shapiro-Barr, Federal Circuit Applies Bilski Standard in Classen, 9 No.
10 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1, Mar. 2009; Robert R. Sachs & Robert A. Hulse, On Shaky
Ground: The (Near) Future of Patents After Bilski, II No. 2 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 8 (2009).
Moreover, Judge Newman believed that Supreme Court cases prior to enactment of 35 U.S.C.
Section 101 do not, contrary to the majority's decision, provide support for limiting the
definition of a "process" to either an apparatus or a transformation. Id. at 983-85.
131. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977-80 (Newman, J., dissenting). These precedents have rejected
per se exclusions of subject matter from 35 U.S.C. Section 101, and provided that processes
implemented on a computer are patent-eligible. Id. at 980-82.
132. Id. at 990-95. Judge Newman has continued to forcefully voice these concerns. See,
e.g., In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1268, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, at **40-41 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13,
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Judge Newman voiced particular concern that the new "machine-
or-transformation" test would have grave consequences to innovation,
thereby undermining the constitutional purpose of the patent law.
Inventiveness in the computer and information services fields has
placed the United States in a position of technological and
commercial preeminence. The information technology industry is
reported to be "the key factor responsible for reversing the 20 year
productivity slow down from the mid-1970's to the mid-1990s and
in driving today's robust productivity growth."..... This powerful
economic move toward "intangibles" is a challenge to the
backward looking change of this court's ruling today. Until the
shift represented by today's decision, statute and precedent have
provided stability in the rapidly moving and commercially vibrant
fields of the Information Age. Despite the economic importance of
these interests, the consequences of our decision have not been
considered. 133
In the end, Judge Newman would have retained the "useful, concrete
and tangible result" test enunciated in State Street Bank. 134 She found
this test had been "proved to be of ready and comprehensible
applicability in a large variety of processes of the information and
digital ages," and was faithful to the Supreme Court's controlling
precedent that distinguished between abstract ideas and their
application to "a particular process for a specified purpose."1 3 5 Lastly,
Judge Newman believed that the majority's newly enunciated test
violated well-settled principles of stare decisis, which she found
2009) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). In discussing what
she viewed as the court's new jurisprudence under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Judge Newman
commented:
The court continues to present a broad and ill-defined exclusion of "business
methods" from access to the patent system, an exclusion that is poorly adapted to
today's new and creative modalities of data handling and knowledge utilization. I
must protest this further contribution to the uncertainty that this court's decisions
are producing. This is not a simple case-specific adjudication between adverse
interests. It can affect many thousands of vested property rights and the
businesses that rely on such property. If these forms of property rights of the
modem age are to be further withdrawn from access to the patent system, it
should not be done in ignorance of the commercial effect. It should not be done
in disregard of the effect on future innovation or on the public and national
interest in new methods and conveniences. The uncertainty that is being
engendered is tantamount to invalidation, for the cost of litigation can deter all
but the deepest pockets. The losers include the public, as the benefits of the
"knowledge economy" are slowed, along with the nation's leadership in
commercial advance based on "knowledge" products. Id.
133. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 992-93.
134. Id. at 991-92.
135. Id.
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particularly disturbing because Congress had not acted to modify the
statute in response to the prior decisions and because the change in
law would impact settled expectation property rights.' 36
E. Judge Rader's Dissenting Opinion Argued the Court Should
Have Relied on the Principle that Abstract Ideas Are Not
Patentable
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Rader concluded that the
case could have been decided on the much simpler principle that
abstract ideas are not patentable, and criticized the majority opinion
as unnecessarily departing from the broad language of the Patent Act,
which "contains no hint of an exclusion for certain types of methods"
from the meaning of the term "process."' 3 7 Judge Rader disagreed
with the majority's adoption of the machine-or-transformation test
and questioned why the expansive language of 35 U.S.C. Section 101
would exclude subject matter "simply because it is not
transformational or properly linked to a machine."13 8 Judge Rader
further argued the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
machine-or-transformation test is merely a restatement of the
principle that abstract ideas are not patentable,' and that non-
patentability of abstractions and natural laws is true to the expansive
language of 35 U.S.C. Section 101. 40 Judge Rader suggested that the
machine-or-transformation test will raise more questions than it
answers, whereas the simple rule that abstract ideas are unpatentable
would have provided more definite guidance. 141
Judge Rader concluded his dissent with a simple and instructive
example based on the fact pattern of Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite, Inc., 142 demonstrating the difference between a patent-
eligible phenomena or relationship and a patent-eligible process for
applying the relationship to obtain a useful, tangible, and concrete
result. The subject matter at issue involved a method to diagnose
whether a patient has high homocysteine levels and low folate, which
can be symptomatic of a potentially fatal condition. 14 3 Judge Rader
136. Id at 993.
137. Id. at 1011-12 (Rader, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1012.
139. Id. at 1013.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1015.
142. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, (2006) (dismissing
grant of certiorari).
143. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing id.).
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explained:
[a] patient may suffer from the unpatentable phenomenon of
nature, namely high homocysteine levels and low folate. But the
invention does not attempt to claim that natural phenomenon.
Instead the patent claims a process for assaying a patient's blood
and then analyzing the results with a new process that detects the
life-threatening condition. Moreover, the sick patient does not
practice the patented invention. Instead the patent covers a process
for testing blood that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible
result: incontrovertible diagnostic evidence to save lives. The
patent does not claim the patent ineligible relationship between
folate and homocysteine, nor does it foreclose future inventors
from usin% that relationship to devise better or different
processes.
Patent law should encourage researchers to "find simple blood tests or
urine tests that predict and diagnose" harmful diseases and that,
unless the standard for patentability is set appropriately, the court will
"inadvertently advise[] investors that they should divert their
unpredictable investments away from discovery of 'scientific
relationships' within the body that diagnose breast cancer or Lou
Gehrig's disease or Parkinson's or whatever."l 4 5
F. Judge Mayer's Dissenting Opinion Argued Business
Methods Should Not Be Permitted and that State Street
Should Be Overruled
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Mayer expresses a very
different conclusion. He argued that the Federal Circuit's decision in
State Street should be overruled because "[a]ffording patent
protection to business methods lacks constitutional and statutory
support, serves to hinder rather than promote innovation, and usurps
144. Id.
145. Id. Medistem, Inc. amplified this concern in its brief requesting Supreme Court
review.
The Federal Circuit's limiting the scope of patentable subject matter for
"process" inventions in Bilski casts a cloud of uncertainty as to whether
Medistem and other biotech companies can continue to protect with patents their
inventions relating to methods of diagnosing causes of diseases and methods of
selecting beneficial treatment protocols. Medistem fears that should biotech
companies lose the ability to obtain enforceable patent protection on diagnostic
and treatment methods, the ability to attract investment capital will sharply
decline, and as a direct result the incentive to search for better ways to diagnose
causes of diseases and find more effective treatments will decline.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Medistem, Inc. in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bilski
v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (mem.).
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that which rightfully belongs in the public domain." 46 Judge Mayer
wrote that "[t]here is nothing in the early patent statutes to indicate
that Congress intended business methods to constitute patentable
subject matter." 4 7 At the time Congress enacted the current Patent
Act in 1952, it was "widely acknowledged that methods of doing
business were ineligible for patent protection." 4 8 Moreover, the
Patent Act of 1952 incorporated prior statutory language, "thus
signaling [Congress'] intent to carry forward the body of case law that
had developed under prior versions of the statute." 4 9 Judge Mayer
concluded that "[b]ecause there is nothing in the language of the 1952
Act, or its legislative history, to indicate that Congress intended to
modify the rule against patenting business methods, we must presume
that no change in the rule was intended."150 Judge Mayer also voiced
concern that business method patents may impede, rather than
promote, the progress of science and the useful arts,' 5 ' and that
business method patents are plagued with poor overall quality.1 52
146. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 999.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Not all Federal Circuit judges agree on the historical treatment of business method
patents. Compare Id. at 989 (Newman, J., dissenting (listing numerous "business method"
patents issued in the 1700's)) and Id. at 999 (Mayer, J., dissenting ("Before the State Street Bank
and Trust case ... it was universally thought that methods of doing or conducting business were
not patentable items" (citation omitted))).
151. Id. at 1006 ("[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection." (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting)). In Judge Mayer's
view, allowing patents to issue on business methods will stifle innovation because they "offer
rewards that are grossly disproportionate to the costs of innovation," they "remove building
blocks of commercial innovation from the public domain," and they "make[] American
companies less competitive in the global marketplace" since "[p]roducing products in the United
States becomes more expensive because American companies, unlike their overseas
counterparts, must incur licensing fees in order to use patented business methods." Id. at 1006-
07 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275-77 (2000) and Brian P. Biddinger,
Limiting the Business Method Patent: A Comparison and Proposed Alignment of European,
Japanese and United States Patent Law, 69 FORDHAM L.REv. 2523, 2546-47 (2001)). Judge
Mayer further believed that "[i]t is often consumers who suffer when business methods are
patented," noting that "[p]attended products are more expensive because licensing fees are often
passed on to consumers." Id. at 1006 (citing Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision:
The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 82 (1999) and Lois Matelan, The Continuing Controversy
Over Business Method Patents, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MED. & ENT. L.J. 189, 201 (2007)).
152. Id. at 1006-07 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006)
(Kennedy, J. joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring)). Judge Mayer highlighted
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Finally, Judge Mayer criticized the machine-or-transformation test
adopted by the majority, stating that it "will do little to stem the
growth of patents on non-technological methods and ideas."
Judge Mayer believed that the proper standard for patentability
rested in a "technological arts" test.'53 In Judge Mayer's view, the
Constitution did not grant Congress "unfettered authority to issue
patents," but granted a more limited power based on promoting
advances in the "useful arts."l 54 "What the framers described as
'useful arts,' we in modem times call 'technology."" 55 Consequently,
"the Constitution explicitly limited patentability to . . . the process
today called technological innovation,"15 which can be understood as
"the application of the law[s] of nature to a new and useful end."l 57
Simply put, "advance[s] over prior art ... in a field of endeavor such
as law. . ., business, . . . or other liberal-as opposed to
technological-art .. . falls outside the patentable subject matter," and
State Street, in his view, should be repudiated. 5 1
V EARLY DECISIONS INTERPRETING INRE BILSKI REFLECT
THE NARROWER DEFINITION OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
Despite the concerns of the dissenters, In re Bilski is being
applied to significant effect in its first few months following its
issuance,159 and is largely viewed as narrowing the scope of
this lack of quality with a list of patents issued after State Street for such things as methods for
training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays, a method for enticing customers to
order additional fast food, and a method of using color-coded bracelets to designate dating status
in order to limit "the embarrassment of rejection." Id. at 1004. Judge Mayer found such patents
ranged "from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd. Id. Moreover, many of these patents
are "facially (even farcically) obvious to persons outside the USPTO." Id. at 1007 (quoting
Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents, 28 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 106 (2002)).
153. Id. at 1002 (quoting In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (CCPA 1970)).
154. Id.(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 and quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan.
City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
155. Id. (citing Pavlik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
156. Id. (citing In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1375).
157. Id. at 1002 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)).
158. Id at 1011.
159. As of June 14, 2009, In re Bilski had been cited in no less than three Federal Circuit
decisions, seven district court decisions, and 102 decisions by the Board of Patent Appeals and
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patentable subject matter. 60 This section summarizes some of the
significant federal court cases to apply Bilski and explains several
decisions from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that
demonstrate the substantial impact the machine-or-transformation test
is having on questions of patentability.
A. Federal Circuit Cases Since In re Bilski Have Started to
Clarify the Machine-or-Transformation Standard
The Federal Circuit returned to the issue of patentable subject
matter in In re Comiskey, a case involving method and apparatus
claims relating to a system imposing mandatory arbitration to resolve
disputes pertaining to unilateral documents (e.g., wills or
contracts). 161 The method claims at issue included steps of: (1)
enrolling the unilateral document and its owner; (2) incorporating
arbitration language "in the unilateral document requiring that any
contested issue related to the document be presented to the pre-chosen
arbitration program for binding arbitration;" (3) requiring "a
complainant to submit a request for arbitration resolution;" (4)
conducting arbitration resolution; and (5) determining "an award or
decision ... [t]hat is final and binding."l 6 2 A second set of claims was
directed to a "system for mandatory arbitration resolution" that
involved a number of "modules" and "means" that perform the steps
set forth in the method claims.16 3 The Federal Circuit characterized
the patent-at-issue in In re Comiskey as a business method patent and
160. See, e.g., Fusco, supra note 130, at l, 7, available at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/fusco-bilski-deja-vu.pdf (Noting that In re Bilski "has potentially
significant implications for innovation in many fields, but particularly in the online commerce
and the software industry," and that the requirement that a patentable transformation involve
"something having a close enough relationship with a physical object or substance ... has the
potential to become a serious obstacle to the patentability of innovations in the newest
technologies, for which it is not always simple to determine the real nature (physical/non-
physical) of a new invention."); see also Woessner & Shapiro-Barr, supra note 130 (Discussing
the non-precedential decision in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed.Appx.
866 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and concluding that "the Bilski standard, now being applied in the area of
biomedical technology, poses a significant threat to the viability of patents claiming diagnostic
methods").
161. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In re Comiskey was the subject
of a previously reported decision, In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), which was
subsequently vacated. See In re Comiskey, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009)
(granting rehearing en banc for the limited purpose of vacating the decision reported at 499 F.3d
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and returning the case to the panel so that it could issue the revised
opinion reported at 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
162. Id. at 970.
163. Id. at 971.
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reiterated that business methods may be patented if they satisfy the
same legal requirements applicable to any other method.164
In holding that the method claims at issue were not patentable,
the Federal Circuit demonstrated that many of the basic principles
guiding the analysis of patentability may still be applied after Bilski.
The court once again confirmed that patentable subject matter is
"extremely broad" under the 1952 Patent Act, but that "a principle, in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right."' 65 The court expounded that "[t]he prohibition against the
patenting of abstract ideas has two distinct (though related) aspects.
First, when an abstract concept has no claimed practical application, it
is not patentable."' 6 6 " Second, the abstract concept may have
practical application."16 7 For example, a claim reciting an algorithm
or abstract concept directed to an industrial process "can state
statutory subject matter only if, as employed in the process, it is
embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves another
class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, or
composition or matter."' 6 8 However, "mental processes - or processes
of human thinking - standing alone are not patentable even if they
have practical application."'169 The court concluded in rejecting these
claims
It is ... clear that the present statute does not allow patents to be
issued on particular business systems-such as a particular type of
arbitration-that depend entirely on the use of mental processes. In
other words, the patent statute does not allow patents on particular
systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence
alone, a field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress
intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter. Thus,
it is established that the application of human intelligence to the
164. Id. at 975-76 ("In State Street Bank, we addressed the 'business method' exception to
statutory subject matter, and stated that '[w]e take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest' (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
165. Id. at 977-78 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852)).
166. Id. at 978 (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)("[a]n
idea of itselfis not patentable") (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. §101).
169. Id. at 979 ("The Supreme Court has stated that '[p]henonomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are th
basic tools of scientific and technological work."' (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67 (1972) (emphasis added).
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solution of practical problems is not in and of itself patentable. 170
Applying these concepts, the court found that the method claims at
issue sought "to patent the use of human intelligence in and of itself,"
and were, therefore, unpatentable. '7
The Federal Circuit had the opportunity to further interpret
Bilski's machine-or-transformation test in In re Ferguson, and gave
important guidance regarding application of the "machine" branch.17 2
The patent-at-issue was directed to a joint marketing scheme. The
patent included a set of claims directed to a "method of marketing a
product," that recited individual steps of "developing a shared
marketing force," using that "shared marketing force to market a
plurality" of products made by a plurality of companies, obtaining a
share of those companies' profits, and obtaining exclusive marketing
rights for the products.17 3 The patent also attempted to claim a
"paradigm for marketing" software products that comprised,
generally, a marketing company that works for a plurality of
companies and shares in the profits of those companies, but that
allows those companies "to retain their autonomy."l 74 The court
found that the method claims were not patentable under Bilski
because they did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test,
finding that they "are not tied to any particular machine or apparatus"
and do not "transform any article into a different state or thing."' 7 1 In
explaining this conclusion, the Federal Circuit provided more detailed
guidance regarding the "machine" branch than it had in Bilski, and
explained that "a machine is a 'concrete thing, consisting of parts, or
of certain devices and combination of devices' including 'every
mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices
to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result."' 176
With regard to the "transformation" branch of the test, the court
stated that the applicants' methods are "directed to organizing
business or legal relationships in the structuring of a sales force (or
170. Id. at 980.
171. However, since the second set of claims reciting "modules" could require the use of a
machine under their broadest reasonable interpretation, the court remanded to the PTO so that it
could review their patentability in the first instance. Id. at 981.
172. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
173. Id at 1361.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1363-64. It seems doubtful that these claims would have fared any better under
the State Street test, since one would be hard-pressed to identify a "useful, concrete and tangible
result" in this abstract method.
176. Id. at 558 F.3d 1364 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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marketing company) . . ." and held that such transformations are not
patent-eligible because "they are not physical objects or substances,
and they are not representative of physical objects or substances."1 77
The court summarily rejected the "paradigm" claims without even
reaching the machine-or-transformation test, because they did not
"fall within any of the four enumerated categories of statutory subject
matter." 78
In its discussion of the patentability of the claims at issue in In re
Ferguson, the court also strongly suggested that the claims in the
State Street case would have been patent-eligible under the machine-
or-transformation test.179 In particular, the court pointed out that the
claims in State Street were drawn to a machine, not to a process. 80
Therefore, according to the panel, the claims in State Street were
"drawn to a patent-eligible machine implementation of what may
have otherwise been a non-patent-eligible abstract idea."' 8'
B. District Court Cases Since In re Bilski Have Applied the
Machine-Or-Transformation Test to Invalidate Previously-
Allowed Patents
In Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease, LLC, the
District Court for the Central District of California applied Bilski's
machine-or-transformation test in a straight-forward manner to a
patent claiming "a business method for creating an investment
instrument out of real property." 82 Three of the claims at issue were
directed to "a series of transactions involving acquiring real estate
property, aggregating the property, selling the property to more than
one entity such that ownership is by tenancy-in-common, and
including in the ownership agreement governing the sale a provision
177. Id. at 1364 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
178. Id. at 1362, 1366 (Noting that the applicants' paradigm claims "do no more than
provide an abstract idea - a business model for an intangible marketing company").
179. Id. at 1365.
180. Id.
181. Id. Since the claims in State Street were written in means-plus-function format, and
the structure identified by the court as corresponding to the claimed process steps included
nothing more than generic computer components, this dicta in In re Ferguson arguably indicates
that merely reciting generic computer components is enough to impart patentability on an
otherwise unpatentable process. As is explained below, however, it appears that the PTO does
not share this view regarding the patentability of computer-implemented processes under the
machine-or-transformation test. This issue will surely be addressed in future Federal Circuit
cases.
182. Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease, LLC, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1053,
1055 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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that the property may be sold at a specific time." 83 A fourth claim
covered "a method of performing a tax-deferred exchange of
investment real estate and details the exchange of ownership interests
among various parties." 84
Applying Bilski, the district court held that the claims did not
satisfy the machine branch of the test because they are not "tied to a
particular machine or apparatus."185 Furthermore, the District Court
held that the patent failed the "transformation" branch, since none of
the claims "transform any article to a different state or thing."186
Like the claims at issue in Bilski, the claims of the [patent-in-suit]
involve only the transformation or manipulation of legal
obligations and relationships. Specifically, the claims of the
[patent-in-suit] only transform or manipulate legal ownership
interests in real estate. Under Bilski, the Court cannot find that
those claims transform an article or thing. 187
Thus, the district court held that all of the claims of the patent at issue
were invalid because they were not drawn to patent-eligible subject
matter. 88
In King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York similarly applied Bilski to
invalidate claims directed to "methods of informing patients about
and administering the muscle relaxant metaxalone."'" The district
court held claims requiring the step of informing the patient about a
property of the drug were invalid because they failed the machine-or-
transformation test.190 "The act of informing another person of the
food effect.. .does not transform the metaxalone into a different state
183. Id. at 1053.
184. Id. at 1053-54. Numerous dependent claims generally included "certain provisions to
be included in the ownership agreements." For example, one dependent claim recited
"identifying a combination of deedshares having different predetermined denominations that
sum to the second value." Id. (quoting Mot. Ex. 1 14:4-6).
185. Id. at 1055 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Indeed, the
Defendant "explicitly acknowledged ... that the recited methods 'need not be performed on a
computer"' and believed that patentability arose not from the "machine" branch of the test, but
rather from the "transformation" branch. Id. (quoting Ex. 2:199).
186. Id. at 1056 (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963).
187. Id. The district court specifically rejected the patentee's argument that the creation of
deedshares constitutes a patent-eligible transformation, stating that "the deedshares themselves
are not physical objects or substances ... " and do not "represent physical object or substances."
Id. (citing Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963).
188. Id. at *12.
189. King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 593 F.Supp.2d 501, 504 (E.D.N.Y.
January 20, 2009).
190. Id. at 512-3 (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957).
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or thing," nor is it tied to any particular machine.19' As such, the
claims failed both branches of the machine-or-transformation test and
were invalid.' 92
In Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,' 93 the District
Court for the Northern District of California applied In re Bilski to
invalidate claims directed to detecting fraudulent credit card
transactions over the Internet. One claim covered a method for
validating an online transaction at a particular Internet address using a
particular credit card by creating and utilizing a geographical map
showing the location of other credit card numbers that have conducted
transactions at that same Internet address.194 The other claim, written
in Beauregard form,'95  covered a "computer readable medium
containing program instructions . . . wherein execution of the program
instructions by one or more processors of a computer system causes
the one or more processors to carry out the steps" for detecting
fraudulent credit card transactions.19 6
The court granted summary judgment of invalidity as to the
method claim and the Beauregard claim because they failed the
machine-or-transformation test for patentability.' 97 With regard to the
transformation prong of the test, the court determined that, while the
claimed inventions may have involved the "manipulation" of credit
card numbers by using them to build a "map," they did not involve
the "transformation" of those numbers.'9 8 The court also determined
that, even if the claimed inventions transformed credit card numbers,
they nonetheless did not transform an "article," which the court
defined as "any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal
191. Id. at 512-3. The court also rejected the claims with purportedly novel limitations of
informing another person of the food effects of metaxalone under Federal Circuit precedent that
"precluded a finding of infringement solely on dissemination of information." Id. at 513 (citing
McElmurray v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The court
elaborated that "[s]uch a claim, which effectively allows a patentee to exclude others from
informing people of (unpatentable) scientific discoveries is anathema to the aims of the patent
statute, which favors disclosure." Id.
192. Id. at 512-5.
193. Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D.Cal. 2009).
194. Id. at 1070-1.
195. A Beauregard claim is named for the case of In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), a two-paragraph opinion that noted the PTO viewed computer programs that are
embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter.
196. Cybersource Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
197. Id. at 1080.
198. Id. at 1073-4.
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representative of any physical object or substance."' 99 The court
reasoned that "a credit card number no more represents a physical
credit card than a card represents a number. Both the number and the
card represent a common underlying abstraction - a credit card
account, which is a series of rights and obligations existing between
an account holder. . . and a card issuer." 2 00 Similarly, the court
determined that the claimed inventions did not transform, or even
manipulate, Internet addresses, stating that it would not make sense to
change the IP addresses, and that an IP address is not a visual
depiction of a computer. 201
Next, the court determined that the claimed inventions are not
tied to a particular machine, as required by the machine prong of the
machine-or-transformation test. 202 The court determined that
recitation of the phrase "over the Internet" does not suffice to tie a
process claim to a "particular machine" for three reasons. First, the
court stated that "the internet is an abstraction.203 If every computer
user in the world unplugged from the internet, the internet would
cease to exist, although every molecule of every machine remained in
place.204 If every computer user in the world unplugged from the
internet, the internet would cease to exist, although every molecule of
every machine remained in place.205 One can touch a computer or a
network cable, but one cannot touch 'the internet."' 20 6 Second,
according to the court, the involvement of the internet merely
constitutes insignificant extra-solution activity.207 Third, the court
stated that "use of the internet does not impose meaningful limits on
the scope of the claims," noting that "[t]he instant claims broadly
preempt the fundamental mental process of fraud detection using
associations between credit card numbers. A limitation to 'only' the
vast area of online credit card transactions is not meaningful."208
The court also commented on the validity of Beauregard claims
in view of the Federal Circuit's opinion in In re Bilski, as well as the
patentability of business methods under the machine-or-
199. Id. at 1074.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1076.






208. Id. at 1078.
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transformation test. The court rejected the argument that Beauregard
claims are exempt from the machine-or-transformation inquiry, noting
that "the legal footing of the so-called Beauregard doctrine is
anything but sure." 2 09 Finally, the court stated that "[a]lthough the
majority declined to say so, Bilski's holding suggests a perilous future
for most business method patents." 21 0 The court poetically concluded
that "[t]he closing bell may be ringing for business method patents,
and their patentees may find they have become bagholders."2 1 1
C. Board decisions since In re Bilski Illustrate How Patentable
Subject Matter May Be Narrowed Following In re Bilski
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has invalidated a
number of claims directed to computer-related inventions under the
new Bilski standard. As discussed below, the Board has found claims
directed to a "computer-readable medium" that performs a series of
process steps to be invalid when the underlying process does not meet
the test for patentability, and that the recitation in a claim of
components of a general purpose computer such as a processor and
memory is insufficient on its own to render a claim patent-eligible.2 12
While the following discussion of these representative cases is not
intended to be exhaustive, it illustrates how In re Bilski is being
applied to limit the patentability of some forms of claims.
1. Ex Parte Mitchell Illustrates How Bilski May Be
Applied to Reject Certain Memory and Data Processing
Claims
The Board applied the machine-or-transformation test to three
representative claims in Ex Parte Mitchell, providing valuable
guidance on how Bilski will be interpreted. The invention at issue
related to diagnosing "memory leaks," which occur "when a program
inadvertently maintains references to objects that are no longer
needed, preventing memory space from being reclaimed for other
uses." 213 The claimed invention operated by identifying sets of data
structures that are likely to evolve in a coherent manner, an indication
that a memory leak has occurred.2 14
209. Id. at 1080.
210. Id. at 1081.
211. Id.
212. Exparte Mitchell, 2009 WL 460662, at *11 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 23, 2009).
213. Id. at *2.
214. Id. at *2-3
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The first claim at issue recited:
A method for identifying co-evolving regions in the memory of a
target application, comprising: receiving information identifying a
set of data structures that are evolving; and classifying the
constituents of the data structures based on their likelihood to
evolve in a single coherent manner.215
The Board held this claim failed the machine branch, because it
did not require the two steps of "receiving information" and
"classifying information" be performed on a particular, or in fact any,
machine or apparatus and would require no more than the mental
,,216steps of receiving information and classifying "constituents. The
preamble specifying that the intended purpose of the claim related to
a memory device likewise did not save the claim, because it did not
serve to limit the claim scope, but merely "state[d] a purpose or
intended use of the invention."217 Finally, the applicant could not save
the claim by arguing that it was broad enough to cover at least some
machine implementations.218 The Board similarly found the claim
failed the transformation branch because it did not "require any kind
of electronic transformation of data into a different state or thing."2 19
The second claim the Board analyzed recited a "computer
readable medium" comprising the instructions to carry out the method
specified in the prior claim:
A computer readable medium for identifying co-evolving regions
in the memory of a target application, comprising instructions for:
receiving information identifying a set of data structures that are
evolving; and classifying the constituents of the data structures
based on their likelihood to evolve in a single coherent manner.220
The Board did not view the introduction of the computer readable
medium as patentably significant:
We see no reason why a 'computer readable medium' containing
'instructions' for the otherwise ineligible method should be treated
any differently from the non-statutory method recited in instant
claim 1. Although a 'computer readable medium' may nominally
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id. at *5-6. Indeed, the claim as written would cover human thought and paper work,
further illustrating that it is not tied to a particular machine or apparatus. Id.
217. Id. at *6 (citing In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
218. Id. at *6-7 (noting that if the claim covers some embodiments outside the statutory
scope, it is not patentable (citing In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 70 (2008)).
219. Id. at *4.
220. Id. at *1.
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fall within the statutory class of 'manufacture,' [this claim] would
effectively pre-empt the abstract idea represented by [the first
claim].
[Additionally, p]lacing the method of claim 1, which pre-
empts substantially all uses of the abstract idea of 'receiving
information' and 'classifying' constituents as claimed, on a
computer readable medium in the form of 'instructions' does not
render the claimed subject matter statutory. Moreover, [this claim]
does not require that a 'computer' do anything. [This claim] is
drawn to a 'computer readable medium' that contains
'instructions.'
Thus, the Board rejected the claim. 22 1
The third claim at issue was drawn to a system comprising a
processor performing instructions corresponding to the steps of the
claimed method:
An information processing system comprising: a processor
comprising logic for performing instructions of: identifying a set of
data structures that are evolving; and classifying the constituents of
the data structures based on their likelihood to evolve in a single
coherent manner; and a memory for storing the instructions. 222
The Board also found the language further limiting the claim scope to
a "processor" was insufficient to achieve patentability:
The use of a 'processor' and 'memory' for storing and performing
the broadly recited 'instructions' . . . would be, in practical effect, a
patent on abstract idea of 'identifying' and 'classifying
constituents' of data structures as recited. Limiting the claim to
part of a system comprising a 'processor' and 'memory' does not
add any practical limitation to the scope of the claim. Similar to a
221. The Board reached the same conclusion regarding the recitation of a "computer
readable medium" in Ex Parte Comea-Hasegan, 2009 WL 86725 (B.P.A.I. 2009). The
application in Comea-Hasegan sought to patent "A computer readable media including program
instructions which when executed by a processor cause the processor to perform" the specified
steps necessary to conduct calculations using a mathematical algorithm. Id. at *1. Again, the
Board found this addition insufficient to render the claim patentable. See id. at *6. ("Here,
Appellant's claim recites computer readable media, but Appellant's claim is still directed to
determining a result from a mathematical algorithm. Additional recitations of computer readable
media, a hardware prediction unit, steps manipulating other data . . . are still insignificant extra-
solution activities that fail to "transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.
Limiting the claim to computer readable media does not add any practical limitation to the scope
of the claim. Such a field-of-use limitation is insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible claim
patent eligible. To permit such a practice would exalt form over substance and permit Appellant
to circumvent the limitations contemplated by § 101.") (citations omitted).
222. Ex Parte Mitchell at * 1.
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field-of-use limitation in a process claim, the use of a general
'processor' and 'memory' is insufficient to render an otherwise
ineligible claim patent eligible.223
2. Ex Parte Scholl Rejected a "Computer-Based" Method
as Failing the Machine-or-Transformation Test
Ex Parte Scholl held that preamble language stating the recited
method claim was "computer-based" did not to establish the claim
was directed to a machine as required under the first prong of the
machine-or-transformation test.224 The claim at issue recited:
A computer-based method for production, the method comprising:
receiving a hierarchical process flow description that describes a
process flow using classes of process elements arranged in a
hierarchy to describe the process flow at increasing levels of detail;
associating a first item description comprising first safety
information regarding safety of a first item with a first process
element in the hierarchical process flow description as an input
into the process flow;
associating a second item description comprising second safety
information regarding safety of a second item with a second
process element in the hierarchical process flow description as an
output from the process flow. 225
223. Id. at *6. (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
('ineligibility under § 101 cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment")). The Board once again reached the same conclusion
in Ex Parte Comea-Hasegan, 2009 WL 86725 (B.P.A.I. 2009). In rejecting a claim that recited
the steps necessary to carry out calculations using a mathematical algorithm, and specifically
required that the steps be performed on an unspecified processor, the Board held that:
The recitation of a 'processor' performing various functions fails to impose any
meaningful limits on the claim's scope. The recitation of a 'processor'
performing various functions is nothing more than a general purpose computer
that has been programmed in an unspecified manner to implement the functional
steps recited in the claims. The recitation of a processor in combination with
purely functional recitations of method steps, where the functions are
implemented using an unspecified algorithm, is insufficient to transform
otherwise unpatentable method steps into a patent eligible process. Holding
otherwise would exalt form over substance and would allow pre-emption of the
fundamental principle present in the non-machine implemented method by the
addition of the mere recitation of a 'processor.' Such a field-of-use limitation is
insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claim patent eligible.
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981) (noting that
eligibility under § 101 'cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a
particular technological environment.')).
224. See Ex Parte Scholl, 2009 WL 288204 (B.P.A.I. 2009).
225. Id.at*L.
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The Board also found that this method claim failed Bilski's
transformation branch because the steps do not "result in the
transformation of an article to a different state or thing." 2 26
The Board found that the claim, when given its broadest
reasonable interpretation, did not satisfy Bilski's machine branch
because it did not "recite any steps that necessarily involve machine
implementation. 227 Thus, the preamble reference to a "computer-
based" method that was not referenced in the limitations did not bring
the otherwise unpatentable claims over the threshold set by Bilski.
3. Ex Parte Barnes Rejected Claims as Failing Both
Branches of the Machine-or-Transformation Test.
Ex Parte Barnes228 gave the Board an opportunity to apply Bilski
to a series of broad claims directed to methods for identifying faults in
seismic data. The two independent claims at issue recited:
A fault identification method that comprises: obtaining seismic
data; and for each of multiple positions of an analysis window in
the seismic data, [and] determining a planarity value for
discontinuities in the analysis window.
A fault identification method that comprises: determining
discontinuity values from seismic data; and applying principal
component analysis to the discontinuity values to identify faults. 29
Further dependent claims included limitations to analyze and display
the data.230
The Board summarily rejected all claims under Bilski. First, the
claims were "directed to non-statutory subject matter," because they
were not tied to a particular machine nor did they transform any
article to a different state or thing.23 1 Moreover, the claims reveal
nothing more than "gathering, analyzing, and displaying" data
without providing "any details as to how the data is gathered,
226. Id. at *7.
227. Id. (emphasis added) ("While the preamble of claim I recites a 'computer-based'
method, the 'computer-based' of claim I is not recited in terms of hardware or tangible
structural elements. Rather, the 'computer-based' method could be implemented on a software
system, where the elements of claim I are implemented solely in software or algorithms. Thus,
the nominal recitation of a 'computer-based' in the preamble does not is not directed to a
particular processor under the machine-or-transformation test.").
228. Ex Parte Barnes, No. 2007-4114, 2009 WL 164074 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 4, 2009).
229. Id, at *1 (claims I and 30).
230. Id. at *7.
231. Id.
5
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analyzed or displayed." 2 32 Such claims are defective under Bilski
because: 1) they "neither specifically call for a machine nor reference
a machine;" 2) "the adding of a data gathering step to a process
claim ... is insufficient to convert a [non-statutory] process into a
patent-eligible process;" 3) "a claim that is drawn only to analyzing of
data is a claim that seeks to pre-empt the use of a fundamental
principle;" and 4) "the displaying of data without more (e.g. a
reference to how and why it is displayed) is determined to be
'insignificant post solution activity' and as such will not transform the
claimed method into a patentable method." 23 3 In short, these claims
suffered from a full catalogue of defects under Bilski, and were
rejected.
4. Ex Parte Gutta Addressed Questions Bilski Left Open
Regarding the Machine Branch
Ex Parte Gutta required the Board to determine whether a claim
purporting to cover a "computerized method" providing automated
recommendations was patentable under the machine-or-
transformation test.234 As set forth in the preamble, the claim was
directed to "a computerized method performed by a data processor for
recommending one or more available items to a target user," that
included the specific steps of:
obtaining a history of selecting one or more available items by at
least one third party;
partitioning a third party selection history into a plurality of
clusters, wherein each cluster contains items that are closer to the
mean of the cluster than any other cluster from among the plurality
of clusters,
modifying a target user's history of selecting said one or more
available items with one or more third party clusters to produce a
modified target user's history;
processing the modified target user's history to generate a target
user profile, wherein the modified target user's history
characterizes preferences of the target user as modified to reflect
preferences of the third party;
generating a recommendation score for at least one of said
available items based on said target user's profile; and
232. Id.
233. Id. (internal citations to In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
omitted).
234. Ex Parte Gutta, No. 2008-3000, 2009 WL 112393, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 15, 2009).
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displaying the recommendation score to the target user.2
The Board concluded that these steps failed Bilski's transformation
branch because the data did not represent physical or tangible objects,
but, rather, intangible information about user selection histories.2 36
In analyzing the machine branch, the Board found that the only
limitations that "could arguably be construed to tie the claimed
process to a particular machine under the first prong of [Bilski]" were
the preamble language reciting "[a] computerized method performed
by a data processor," and the step of "displaying the [calculated
result] to [a] target user." 2 37 Even though satisfaction of this branch
was "the exact issue that the court in Bilski declined to decide," the
Board found sufficient guidance in the Bilski court's explanation that
"the use of a specific machine must impose meaningful limits on the
claim's scope to impart patent-eligibility." 2 38 The Board found that
field of use restriction imposed by the preamble recitation of a
"computerized method performed by a data processor," which added
"nothing more than a general purpose computer. . . associated with
the steps of the process in an unspecified manner, was not sufficient
to render the invention patentable." 2 3 9 The limitation requiring
"displaying" was also insufficient because the step "need not be
performed by any particular structure," and could "be accomplished
simply by writing the resulting score on a piece of paper." 240 Indeed,
concluding that "such post-solution activity" imparted patentability to
a mathematical algorithm claim "would exalt form over substance." 24 1
Thus, the claim at issue failed both branches of the machine-or-
transformation test, and the claim was deemed unpatentable.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD OVERTURN INRE BILSKI
A. Bilski's Restrictive Test Violates Long-Established Policies
Central to the U.S. Patent System
As discussed in detail above, Supreme Court precedent and the
U.S. Patent Act interpret the scope of patentability broadly. Unless an
inventor seeks to claim a law of nature, a basic mathematical
235. Id.
236. Id. at *3.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961-62).
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algorithm, an abstract idea or the like, "anything under this sun that is
made by man" is potentially patentable. 24 2 This open-ended approach
has permitted the patent system to serve its Constitutional function of
promoting the "useful" arts by granting inventors patent protection on
many of the fundamental advances that have defined the rise of the
United States economy. Ground-breaking inventions patented in the
United States revolutionized the agrarian economy of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries,243 transformed mobility and gave rise to
modem transportation, 244 developed the energy sources that enabled
ever-advancing technology, 245  created modem communications, 2 4 6
opened the digital age with the basic components of the modem
computer,24 7 transformed the computer age into the information age
242. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309.
243. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 72-X (issued March 14, 1794), entitled "Cotton Gin
Patent," issued to Eli Whitney; U.S. Patent No. 46,454 (issued Feb. 21, 1865), entitled
"Improvement to Plows," issued to John Deere.
244. Indeed, the U.S. Patent system furthered successive generations of transportation
from the age of steam (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 54 (issued Oct. 15, 1836), entitled "Art of
Managing and Supplying Fire For Generating Steam In Locomotive Engines," issued to
Matthias W. Baldwin), to the age of automobiles (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,005,186 (filed
Aug. 12, 1909), entitled "Transmission Mechanism," issued to Henry Ford), airplanes (see, e.g.,
U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (filed Mar. 23, 1903), entitled "Flying Machine," issued to Orville
Wright and Wilbur Wright), and even to the age of rocketry (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 2,397,657
(filed June 23, 1941), entitled "Control Mechanism For Rocket Apparatus," issued to Robert H.
Goddard).
245. These energy sources range from simple alternating current (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No.
381,968 (issued May 1, 1888), entitled "Electro-Magnetic Motor" issued to Nikola Tesla), to
nuclear fission (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 2,708,656 (issued May 17, 1955), entitled "Neutronic
Reactor," issued to Enrico Fermi).
246. The patented communications systems include a wide range of seminal advances,
including the telegraph (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,647 (issued June 20, 1840), entitled
"Improvement In The Mode Of Communicating Information by Signals by the Application of
Electro-Magnetism, issued to Samuel F. Morse), the telephone (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No.
174,465 (issued Mar. 7, 1876), entitled "Improvement in Telegraphy," issued to Alexander
Graham Bell), radio (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 645,576 (issued March 20, 1900), entitled
System of Transmission of Electrical Energy," issued to Nikola Tesla; U.S. Patent No. 649,621
(issued May 15, 1900), entitled "Apparatus For Transmission Of Electrical Energy," issued to
Nikola Tesla; U.S. Patent No. 586,193 (issued July 13, 1897), entitled "Transmitting Electrical
Signals," issued to Guglielmo Marconi), and television (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,773,980
(issued Aug. 30, 1930) entitled "Television System," issued to Philo T. Farnsworth).
247. These advances include the basic structure for a digital computer (see, e.g., U.S.
Patent No. 2,668,661 (issued Feb. 9, 1954), entitled "Complex Computer," issued to George
Stibitz), the transistor (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 2,981,877 (issued Apr. 25, 1961), entitled
"Semiconductor Device-and-Lead Structure," issued to Robert N. Noyce; U.S. Patent No.
2,502,488 (issued April 4, 1950), entitled "Semiconductor Amplifier," issued to William
Shockley; U.S. Patent No. 2,524,035 (issued Oct. 3, 1950), entitled "Three-Electrode Circuit
Element Utilizing Semiconductor Materials," issued to John Bardeen and Walter H. Brattain),
and dynamic random access memory (DRAM), (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,387,286 (issued
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by connecting multiple computers in individual locations with local
area networks248 and linking the entire globe through the internet, 2 49
and lengthened human lifespan through advances in medicine and,
ultimately, by using and manipulating the basic DNA structure of
life.250
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court precedent interpreting
patentability broadly, and its express caution not to "read into the
patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed," 2 5 1 the Federal Circuit's majority opinion in Bilski created
a restrictive patentability test, requiring that all patented processes be
tied to a specific machine or apparatus or that they result in a
"transformation."2 52 As set forth in sections I1I.D, III.E, and III.F,
above, this new test was met with harsh criticism from the three
dissenting Federal Circuit judges.
The majority's new machine-or-transformation standard runs
counter to the flexibility of the patent system under which more than
two centuries of technological innovations have flourished. The
American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA")
forcefully argued in its brief supporting Supreme Court review of
Bilski that the Federal Circuit's new test is, in fact, a hindrance to the
progress of science and the useful arts.2 53 The broad language of
Section 101 specifying that "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter" 254 falls with the ambit of the
patent system represents a "dynamic provision designed to encompass
June 4, 1968), entitled "Field-Effect Transistor Memory," issued to Robert H. Dennard).
248. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,063,220 (filed March 31, 1975), entitled "Multipoint Data
Communication System With Collision Detection," issued to Robert Metcalfe, et al.
249. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,799,258 (filed Feb. 7, 1985), entitled "Apparatus And
Method For Granting Access To Computers," issued to Donald W. Davies; U.S. Patent No.
6,574,628 (filed Oct. 21, 1997), entitled "System for Distributed Task Execution," issued to
Robert E. Kahn, et al.
250. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 2,442,141 (issued May 25, 1948), entitled "Method For
Production Of Penicillin," issued to Andrew J. Moyer; U.S. Patent No. 4,708,818, (filed Oct. 8,
1985), entitled "Human Immunodeficiency Viruses Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), A Diagnostic Method For Aids And Pre-Aids, and A Kit Therefor," issued to
Lue Montagnier, et al.; U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979), entitled "Process For
Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras," issued to Stanley N. Cohen and
Herbert W. Boyer.
251. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
252. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
253. Brief for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Petition For a Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009)
(mem.) at 5.
254. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
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new and unforeseen inventions." 2 55 However, the restrictive machine-
or-transformation test imports limitations into Section 101 based on
the 130-year old language of Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780
(1877),256 and severely limits its ability to protect today's inventors:
Computations formerly done by hand are now performed by
integrated circuits smaller than a fingernail. Frequently, there is no
longer a physical structure responsible for those operations. One
might describe them as ethereal or transient, affected by software
in networks, but this is the direction of today's innovation.
In the future, society can look forward to innovations and advances
in the emerging fields of nanotechnology, biotechnology, health
sciences and personalized medicine. As technology thus ventures
from the recognized into the unknown, innovation should be no
less protectable than in previous eras of transition.257
Indeed, the machine-or-transformation test may not even be well-
suited for many of the seminal inventions of the past century,
including foundational patents in radio, signal processing, wireless
communications, and medical diagnostics and treatment.25 8
In issuing its decision, the Bilski majority set a new, rigid test for
patentability that elevated a single criteria set forth in Gottshalk v.
Benson to be the sole test for the patentability of novel processes.259
That step is impermissible under recent Supreme Court cases.
B. The Supreme Court Has Recently Rejected Rigid, Judicially
Imposed Tests on Patentability
The Supreme Court has reviewed Federal Circuit decisions in
several cases in the past three years and has revolutionized the law on
several issues in patent jurisprudence.26 0 One of these cases, KSR
255. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135
(2001) "Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because new
types of inventions are often unforeseeable." Id. at 135 (quotation omitted). See also Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) ("[It is not our purpose to] freeze process patents to old
technologies, leaving no room for the revelations of the new, on rushing technology.").
256. See, e.g., AIPLA Amicus Brief, at 9.
257. Id. at 2-3.
258. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association in Support of Petitioners,
Bilski, 129 S. Ct. 2735 at 8 (arguing that seminal patents granted over many decades in each of
these fields are of doubtful validity under Bilski's restrictive test).
259. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 955-56 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process
that does not include particular machines") (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 70)).
260. See Quanta v. LG Electronics, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (reversing the Federal Circuit
and strengthening the doctrine of patent exhaustion); Medlmmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118
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International Co. v. TeleFlex, Inc., offers a useful roadmap to the
Supreme Court's likely approach in Bilski.
Pursuant to section 103, an invention is patentable only if it is
"non-obvious" to one of ordinary skill in the art to which it
pertains.261 Prior to KSR, an accused infringer could show a patent
claim was obvious based on a combination of two or more prior art
references only if it could establish that the prior art, the knowledge
of a person having ordinary skill in the art, or the nature of the
problem contained a teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine
262the references. Even though recognizing that the test was developed
in order to "resolve the question of obviousness with more uniformity
and consistency," the Supreme Court summarily rejected this rigid
rule as "contrary to §103 and [its] precedents." 2 63 "Throughout this
Court's engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have
set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way
the Court of Appeals applied its [teaching-suggestion-motivation] test
here." 2 64 The Court noted that the Federal Circuit's predecessor court,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, had first formulated the test
as a "helpful insight" in deciding obviousness.265
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory
formulas; and when it is so applied, the [teaching-suggestion-
motivation] test is incompatible with our precedents. The
obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation ....
The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modem technology
(2007) (reversing a long-standing Federal Circuit governing jurisdiction in declaratory judgment
actions and greatly reducing the burden on an accused patent infringer to file and maintain a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of invalidity and non-infringement); KSR
Int'l Co. v. TeleFlex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (reversing well-developed Federal Circuit
precedent governing obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLP, 547
U.S. 388 (2006) (overruling the Federal Circuit's rule granting permanent injunctions as a
matter of course against infringers and holding that the four-factor test governing injunctive
relief in other contexts applies in patent infringement cases).
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
262. See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 1999); See
also C.R. Bard Inc. v. M3Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351-1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing
judgment of invalidity on the grounds of obviousness because the prior art lacked the "essential
evidentiary component" of a "teaching or suggestion or motivation" to combine the asserted
references); ACS Hosp. Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to
produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the
combination.").
263. KSR, 550 U.S. at 407.
264. Id. at 415.
265. Id. at 418 (citing Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961)).
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counsel against limiting the analysis in this way.266
The Federal Circuit's majority holding in Bilski repeats the same error
that led to the Supreme Court's decision in KSR, namely, ignoring the
"expansive and flexible approach" toward patentability clearly
mandated by the Supreme Court jurisprudence and elevating the
"machine-or-transformation" test's "helpful insight" to the one and
only test for patentability. That result should not stand.
C. State Street's Useful, Concrete and Tangible Result Test
Accurately Represents Congressional Intent regarding the
Proper Boundary for Patentability
The Federal Circuit's restrictive test, which rules out
patentability for many business methods, also contravenes
Congressional intent. Congress has never changed, and has in fact
approved, the useful, concrete and tangible result test first enunciated
in State Street. Not long after the Federal Circuit issued its opinions in
the State Street and AT&T cases, Congress passed the First Inventor
Defense Act, which provided that:
It shall be a defense to an action for infringement under section
271 of this title with respect to any subject matter that would
otherwise infringe one or more claims for a method in the patent
being asserted against a person, if such person had, acting in good
faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year
before the effective filing date of such patent, and commercially
used the subject matter before the effective filing date of such
patent. 267
For the purpose of the act, the term "method" is defined as "a method
of doing or conducting business." 268 The First Inventor Defense Act,
which was later codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273(b), thereby
provides an infringement defense to companies or individuals who
invented, but did not patent or disclose, a business method which
subsequently was patented by someone else. In passing this act,
Congress expressly recognized and concurred that business methods
should be patentable, and did not act to modify in any way the
standard for patentability set forth in State Street. Moreover, Congress
has repeatedly rejected attempts to deny patentability to business
269 Co
method patents. Since Congress has chosen not to amend the
266. Id. at 419.
267. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
268. Id.
269. Shortly after the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Representatives Howard Berman
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boundaries set in State Street and not to limit the patentability of
business method patents, the courts should also refrain from
excluding the entire field from the patent system.270
VII.CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit majority opinion in In re Bilski represents a
dramatic departure from well settled principles at the core of the U.S.
Patent system. Long-standing Supreme Court authority and the
statutes governing patentability require a more flexible approach to
patentability than is afforded under the "machine-or-transformation"
test. The Supreme Court set forth the appropriate analysis of
patentability in its seminal cases Gottshalk v. Benson, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, and Diamond v. Diehr, and the Federal Circuit
faithfully interpreted that standard in State Street and its subsequent
decisions following that case. The Supreme Court has the opportunity
to overrule In re Bilski and return to a flexible standard as has served
the Constitutional purposes of the patent laws for more than 200
years.
and Rick Boucher introduced two additional pieces of legislation that would have limited the
patentability of business methods, but neither of these acts passed. See The Business Method
Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2000); The Business Method Improvement
Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001). Similar legislation also failed in 2004.
270. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J.
(dissenting) ("Where, as here, Congress has not acted to modify the statute in the many years
since Diehr, and the decision of this court, the force of stare decisis is even stronger." (citations
omitted)). See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (quoting United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933) (cautioning court not to "read into the
patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed").
83
* * *
